When was the hotline installed

The highly tense diplomatic exchange that followed was plagued by delays caused by slow and tedious communication systems. Encrypted messages had to be relayed by telegraph or radioed between the Kremlin and the Pentagon. It was agreed that the line would be used only in emergencies, not for more routine governmental exchanges.

An article in The New York Times described how the new system would work: Kennedy would relay a message to the Pentagon via phone, which would be immediately typed into a teletype machine by operators at the Pentagon, encrypted and fed into a transmitter. The message could reach the Kremlin within minutes, as opposed to hours. In , President Lyndon B. Johnson became the first U. The need became frighteningly obvious during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October The United States had discovered that the Soviets were building missile sites in Cuba capable of firing missiles with nuclear warheads.

Eventually, then president John F. Days of tensions ensued as the world literally sat waiting to see whether or not World War III was imminent. Then came a breakthrough: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed that his country would not install nuclear weapons in Cuba; Kennedy, in turn, vowed not to threaten the sovereignty of Cuba.

In designing the hotline, the idea was to expedite written communication and slow down verbal exchanges, so that cooler heads might prevail: if leaders spoke in real time, there could be translation problems, or heated misunderstandings. Instead, each side got special teletype machines, which zipped written messages straight to official translators.

The first test message from the U. These would benefit from having dedicated staff, facilities, and communications in both capitals and, if needed, in distributed locations elsewhere. Locating this structure at the top of the government indicates the importance of nuclear issues and helps facilitate the execution of decisions. Like the U. A structure at the NCA level would encompass civilian organizations and serve as a vital link to coordinate nuclear safety, health, and environmental concerns between neighbors.

Neither New Delhi nor Islamabad is pushing for a hotline, and neither is willing to implement such an initiative in response to international desires. Relations between the two are poor, with considerable mutual hostility and no trust. Both are content to use existing formal and informal diplomatic links to communicate with each other, supported by the hotline between their respective armies to manage the level of violence along the LoC.

Regardless, there are two potential benefits that support their national interests that may transcend their mutual enmity: managing risks associated with expanding nuclear infrastructure, and the need to manage unforeseen actions or events during major crises. India and Pakistan are expanding their nuclear programs, including civilian power-generation and research capabilities. Consequently, there are more facilities, more sensitive material being shipped, and more people involved, increasing the odds of accidents and security problems.

India is seeking to expand its civilian nuclear-power industry significantly to support economic development and reduce pollution caused by coal and other fossil fuels. While implementation of its plans has slowed, India wants to build more than 20 nuclear power reactors over the next couple of decades.

Meanwhile, Pakistan is buying Chinese nuclear power reactors to reduce oil imports and support economic development. There is a real prospect of an accident or security incident occurring. Almost every other country with nuclear power reactors has experienced incidents ranging from small-scale accidents to major events e. Moreover, depending on the location of the incident, a nuclear hotline may allow for coordination of a response if there are health or environmental risks.

Such a hotline would include civilians, thereby linking the key elements directly affected by such a reactor accident. Establishing this hotline at the NCA level would also combine military and security elements that could aid in dispelling rumors. By integrating civilian and military elements, those organizations with the most capacity to respond to a serious accident would be quickly mobilized. India and Pakistan have agreed in broad terms that nuclear accidents are issues they should discuss, and an NCA hotline could serve as the communication link.

A hotline is likely to be of little benefit in preventing a crisis if India or Pakistan is intent on using force or threatening force, including nuclear weapons, to gain political advantage. Nonetheless, a communications link between their NCAs would be useful in reducing the risk that unintended ups and downs in their relationship could escalate beyond what the either side expects.

In this way, a hotline between the NCAs would serve the same function as the existing hotline between the directors general of military operations DGMOs , but for nuclear crises. India and Pakistan have normalized its use to manage tensions and calibrate actions in order to prevent escalation beyond the level that either government wants.

As both countries deploy and normalize their nuclear forces aimed at each other, they should establish a similar means to manage potential nuclear tensions. Beyond the broader mission of managing crisis-escalation risks, the changing nature of nuclear forces in India and Pakistan makes crisis de-escalation increasingly challenging.

Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev came to the brink of war during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a showdown aggravated by communication delays. The system used teletype and telegraph terminals manned by military translators, tasked with relaying messages from their commanders-in-chief through two systems: a radio line and a transatlantic cable. The American terminal was in the Pentagon, where it remains. The first test message from Washington to Moscow, on Aug.

Over the years, the systems were updated with advances in technology: satellites, fax machines, computers, email. The point was to exchange information quickly, but never verbally, to avoid misunderstandings. Glenn Nordine was one of the Russian-speaking Army translators assigned to operate the Pentagon terminal when it was first installed. He recalled a massive piece of machinery in the National Military Command Center, near the seats of country-desk officers and at the opposite end of corridor-like room from a glass-walled cubicle where a general sat.